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Research summary: We analyze how a host market’s institutional context can influence an MNE’s 
senior management’s choice and deployment of corporate political activity (CPA). First, we argue that 
a non-engaged approach to CPA is likely to be chosen when senior management perceives high host-
country political risk, arising not only from host-country political institutions, but also from the 
distance between home and host-government relations. Second, we propose that the deployment of 
this approach can require active adaptation through four political strategies: low-visibility, ensuring a 
minimal degree of general attention from other actors; rapid-compliance, entailing high speed actions 
to obey the rules; reconfiguration, involving re-arranging the MNE’s structure and processes for 
competitiveness; and anticipation, implying the prediction of public policy and analysis of interest 
groups to anticipate responses. 
 
Managerial summary: Senior managers of multinational enterprises (MNEs) often examine when 
and how to engage, or not to engage, with host governments. We argue that senior managers are likely 
to choose to evade engagement with a host government when they perceive high host-country political 
risk, not only through public political risk ratings, but also via their home and host-government 
relations. We show that this choice can require senior managers to lead active adaptation through four 
strategies: low-visibility, enabling the MNE to operate under the radar of host governments; rapid-
compliance, entailing high speed actions to obey the rules; reconfiguration, involving re-arranging the 
MNE’s structure and processes for competitiveness; and anticipation, implying the prediction of 
public policy and analysis of interest groups to anticipate responses. 
 
KEYWORDS: corporate political activity; political risk; home and host-government relations; 




TO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS:  
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND HOST-COUNTRY POLITICAL RISK 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporate political activity (CPA) research focuses on firms’ engaging with government to influence 
public policy in ways favorable to their corporate interests (Hillman, Keim, and Schuler, 2004). In 
contrast, neo-institutional theory has concentrated on firms not engaging with government, but rather, 
passively conforming to institutional pressures (Scott, 2014). Yet, few studies have kept pace with 
multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) cross-border CPA choices (Blumentritt, 2003; Kobrin, 2015). 
These choices ultimately dichotomize into, first, an engaged approach to CPA, that involves engaging 
with host governments to influence host-country public policy, and second, a non-engaged approach to 
CPA, that involves not engaging with host governments but rather, avoiding or conforming to host-
country public policy.  
Building on the notion that a global approach to MNE CPA is unlikely to be successful 
(Baron, 1995; Blumentritt, 2003; Kobrin, 2015), we argue that that both CPA research and neo-
institutional theory remain unclear as to how the institutional context of a host market can influence an 
MNE’s senior management’s choice of when to deploy an engaged or a non-engaged approach to 
CPA. We address this gap to explore how the institutional context of a host market can influence when 
an MNE’s senior management chooses a non-engaged approach to CPA, and examine how this 
approach is deployed. We aim to answer two research questions. First, how can the institutional 
context of a host market influence when an MNE’s senior management chooses a non-engaged 
approach to CPA? Second, how does an MNE deploy a non-engaged approach to CPA in host 
markets? 
We focus on a non-engaged approach to CPA for two reasons. First, from a neo-institutional 
perspective, theoretical arguments explain that a non-engaged approach to CPA can be a deliberate 
choice when the institutional context offers high levels of environmental uncertainty (Oliver, 1991). 
Whereas CPA literature explains that a non-engaged approach to CPA can be caused by, the non-
necessity of engaging due to the favorability of government policy toward the interests of the firm; 
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restrictive regulatory conditions that impede a firm from participating in government affairs; or a 
firm’s inability to engage based on its relative lack of political resources and capabilities (Boddewyn 
and Brewer, 1994; Bonardi, Holburn, and Vanden Bergh, 2006; Holburn and Zelner, 2010). Overall, 
our core contention with extant literature is that we require further institutional-based explanations of 
the deliberate choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA, particularly, that originate in host markets 
and from empirical evidence. Second, how MNEs deploy a non-engaged approach to CPA in host 
markets has been underexplored. Neo-institutional theorists argue that a non-engaged approach to 
CPA can be deployed by the strategies of avoidance or acquiescence (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014). 
While CPA literature has theoretically conceptualized non-engaged political strategies that are lacking 
empirical support (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). Thus, to improve our 
understanding of how a non-engaged approach to CPA can be deployed by MNEs in host markets, we 
argue that further empirical evidence is required. 
To answer our research questions, we used an inductive case study that tracked the CPA 
choices deployed over sixteen years by Nutresa, a large Colombian MNE, in its five primary host 
markets: the United States, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Nutresa leads the food 
business of one of the most powerful business groups in Colombia, the Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño 
(GEA). In 2015, the GEA generated an income of USD $50 billion, which accounted for more than 5 
percent of Colombia’s GDP (Dinero, 2016). We selected Nutresa because, despite identifying 
opportunities to improve the favorability of host-government policies and regulatory conditions 
allowing its participation in host-government affairs, and although it possessed the political resources 
and capabilities required to engage with host governments, Nutresa deliberately chose and deployed a 
non-engaged approach to CPA in some of its primary host markets.  
Our study makes three contributions to the extant literature. First, building on neo-institutional 
theory (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014) and drawing on political economy (Hirschman, 
1970), we identify that when an MNE’s senior management perceives high host-country political risk, 
it is more likely to choose a non-engaged approach to CPA in the host market. Thus, we extend the 
literatures on neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014) and the antecedents 
of CPA choices (for reviews on antecedents of CPA see Hillman et al., 2004 and Lux, Crook, and 
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Woehr, 2011) by theoretically classifying and explaining an MNE’s senior management’s perceived 
host-country political risk as an antecedent of MNE CPA choices in host markets. Moreover, we 
explain how the influence of perceived host-country political risk is moderated not only by risk arising 
from host-country political institutions (Henisz, 2000; Stevens, Xie, and Peng, 2016), but also by risk 
emanating from the distance between an MNE’s home and host-government relations (Blumentritt and 
Nigh, 2002; Ghemawat, 2001). We argue that despite the level of risk arising from host-country 
political institutions, a high level of distance between an MNE’s home and host-government relations 
is likely to increase an MNE’s senior management’s perceived host-country political risk. 
Consequently, senior management is more likely to choose a non-engaged approach to CPA in the 
host market. 
Second, we develop a nuanced conceptualization of approaches to CPA that challenges the 
notion that not engaging with government only involves avoiding or passively conforming to 
institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014). In contrast, we explain that when an MNE’s senior 
management perceives high host-country political risk, it is more likely to choose a non-engaged 
approach to CPA that involves either avoiding or actively adapting to host-country public policy. We 
detail how actively adapting to host-country public policy can be deployed through four legal non-
engaged political strategies. These are: low-visibility strategy, that ensures a minimal degree of 
general attention from political and social actors; rapid-compliance strategy, that entails high speed 
actions to obey the rules; reconfiguration strategy, that involves re-arranging the MNE’s 
organizational structure and processes for competitiveness; and anticipation strategy, that implies the 
prediction of public policy and analysis of interest groups to anticipate responses. In so doing, we 
develop a taxonomy of legal non-engaged political strategies that improves our understanding of how 
a non-engaged approach to CPA can be deployed (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Oliver 
and Holzinger, 2008; Shafer, 1995). 
Third, our study contributes to a growing strand of literature focused on the analysis of 
emerging market MNEs, as Nutresa is an emerging market MNE from Latin America. This strand of 
literature suggests that several unique characteristics of Latin American countries, such as political 
uncertainty, make multilatinas a research laboratory with potential for extending not only the 
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understanding of these firms but also, and more importantly, the understanding of theories and models 
that explain the behavior of MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). In the case of Nutresa, its country of 
origin proved a challenge to expanding operations into some high political risk emerging economies in 
Latin America. This enabled Nutresa to develop expertise in managing high political risk in host 
markets in different ways (Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc, 2008). Such experience is relevant to all MNEs, 
as it can become a source of advantage, not only in managing operations in host markets with high 
political risk, but also in managing the diversity of institutional contexts across host markets to 
internationalize more widely (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Hence, through a fine-grained analysis of this 
special and revelatory case, we extend our understanding of multinationals’ corporate political 
behavior in various institutional contexts (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2016). 
Taken together, these contributions offer, first, a framework that explains the influence of 
perceived host-country political risk on MNE CPA choices in host markets, and second, a taxonomy 
of legal non-engaged political strategies to stay in or enter host markets of high political risk. Both, 
constitute what Hafsi and Thomas (2005) refer to as walking sticks to assist MNEs’ senior 
management in their CPA decision-making processes. Yet, the most important implication of this 
study for management practice is to shed light on an underexplored option available when perceiving 
high host-country political risk—the option of loyalty. This option implies staying in or entering a host 
market by not engaging with its host government, but rather, actively adapting to host-country public 
policy through legal non-engaged political strategies. In contrast, when confronting challenging host-
country conditions, most previous studies discuss the option to exit (Meyer et al., 2009; Rodriguez, 
Uhlenbruck, and Eden, 2005). 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Approaches to CPA and political strategies  
We define corporate political activity as corporate attempts to manage government policy through an 
engaged or a non-engaged approach. Extant research has focused on an engaged approach to CPA, 
enabling an MNE to influence host-country public policy by engaging with the host government 
(Baysinger, 1984; Hillman et al., 2004; Lawton, McGuire, Rajwani, 2013). This approach can allow 
an MNE to have greater power to exert influence over host-country public policy, the greater its 
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engagement with the host government or embeddedness in host-government affairs (Heidenreich, 
2012; Kostova, Roth, and Dancin, 2008; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). To deploy an engaged approach 
to CPA, a large body of research discusses several taxonomies that list and describe the engaged 
political strategies that can be used (Aplin and Hegarty, 1980; Baysinger, 1984; Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994; Bonardi, Hillman, and Keim, 2005; Getz, 1993; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Hillman et al., 
2004; Oberman, 1993; Oliver, 1991; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). The three generic engaged political 
strategies—information, financial incentive, and constituency-building—conceptualized by Hillman 
and Hitt (1999) drawing on exchange theory, have become the most cited. Examples of the tactics 
used to deploy these engaged political strategies include lobbying host-government decision makers 
by providing information about the potential impact of possible legislation, making financial campaign 
contributions, and expressing support for a political party through advocacy advertising (see Hillman 
and Hitt, 1999).  
On the other hand, a non-engaged approach to CPA has the aim of enabling an MNE to avoid 
or conform to host-country public policy by evading engagement with the host government or 
exercising disembeddedness from host-government affairs (Heidenreich, 2012; Scott, 2014). From a 
neo-institutional perspective, avoiding host-country public policy can be achieved by the strategy of 
avoidance while conforming to host-country public policy can be enabled by the strategy of 
acquiescence (Oliver, 1991). Examples of the tactics used to deploy these two non-engaged political 
strategies include avoiding operations in the host market and complying with host-country public 
policy without aiming to shape or modify its contents. In contrast to neo-institutional theory, CPA 
research has provided less attention to a non-engaged approach to CPA. Nonetheless, four distinctive 
non-engaged political strategies that have been theoretically conceptualized in this strand of literature, 
however lacking empirical support, are: avoidance, compliance, circumvention (see Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994), and anticipatory (see Oliver and Holzinger, 2008). Examples of the tactics used to 
deploy these non-engaged political strategies, include again, avoiding operations in the host market 
and complying with host-country public policy without aiming to shape or modify its contents. Also, 
undertaking circumvention or illegal activities such as trade smuggling and anticipating potential 
changes in host-country public policy to design early compliance mechanisms.  
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It is worth noting that both an engaged and a non-engaged approach to CPA involve MNEs’ 
compliance with host-country public policy. However, under an engaged approach to CPA, MNEs 
comply with host-country public policy as they search to shape or modify its contents in ways 
favorable to their corporate interests. Whereas under a non-engaged approach to CPA, MNEs comply 
with host-country public policy without aiming to shape or modify its contents (see Table 1). 
Insert Table 1 Here 
Antecedents of CPA choices 
Among the antecedents that can influence an MNE’s senior management’s choice of when to deploy 
an engaged or a non-engaged approach to CPA in host markets are firm, industry, issue-specific, and 
institutional factors (Hillman et al., 2004 and Lux et al., 2011). Most CPA studies focus on how these 
factors influence when an engaged approach to CPA is chosen. These studies have found that an 
engaged approach to CPA is likely to be chosen when firms achieve a sufficient size to enable the 
development of political resources and capabilities to engage with government (Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994; Keim and Baysinger, 1988; Masters and Keim, 1985), belong to a highly regulated 
industry (Evans, 1988; Grier and Munger, 1993), view a specific political issue as important (Schuler 
and Rehbein, 1997; Vogel, 1996), or find that collective goods are missing in the institutional context 
and therefore engage with government to collaborate in their creation (Boddewyn and Doh, 2011). 
Beyond the findings of these individual studies, a meta-analysis identified the primary antecedents that 
can influence the choice of an engaged approach to CPA as firm size, level of government regulation, 
and a politician’s ability to deliver demanded policy (Lux et al., 2011). In addition, from a neo-
institutional perspective, theoretical arguments suggest that an MNE is more likely to choose an 
engaged approach to CPA, the lower the level of environmental uncertainty in the institutional context 
(Oliver, 1991). 
In contrast, scarce attention has focused on the factors that can influence when a non-engaged 
approach to CPA is chosen. Prior CPA research explains that the choice of a non-engaged approach to 
CPA is often perceived as caused by, the non-necessity of engaging due to the favorability of 
government policy toward the interests of the firm; restrictive regulatory conditions that impede a firm 
from participating in government affairs; or a firm’s inability to engage based on its relative lack of 
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political resources and capabilities (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Bonardi et al., 2006; Holburn and 
Zelner, 2010). While from a neo-institutional perspective, theoretical arguments suggest that a non-
engaged approach to CPA can be a deliberate choice when the institutional context offers high levels 
of environmental uncertainty (Oliver, 1991). 
To advance our understanding of the antecedents of CPA choices, extant literature suggests 
that future research can build on empirical work (Lux et al., 2011). We aim to respond to this call by 
using empirical evidence to show how the institutional context of a host market can influence MNE 
CPA choices, particularly, the choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA.  
MNE CPA choices in host markets 
We build on neo-institutional theory (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014) and draw on 
political economy using Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty framework, to explore MNE CPA 
choices in host markets. Early neo-institutional theory neglected the view of a non-engaged approach 
to CPA as a deliberate choice (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer and 
Scott, 1983). Power was attributed to the institutional context, while firms were regarded as passive 
victims of institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014). This perspective raised 
criticisms for its assumptions of organizational passivity and its failure to address organizational self-
interests and active agency in firms’ direct responses to the institutional context (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Perrow, 1985; Powell, 1985). Consequently, subsequent research recognized that firms not only have 
the power to choose their direct responses to the institutional context, but also to respond in diverse 
ways, ranging from passively conforming to exerting influence over institutional pressures (Oliver, 
1991; Scott, 2014). Under this view, theoretical arguments claimed that a non-engaged approach to 
CPA can be a deliberate choice when the institutional context offers high levels of environmental 
uncertainty (Oliver, 1991). 
Despite neo-institutional theorists recognizing that firms have the power to choose their direct 
responses to the institutional context, government continued to be viewed as relying on the power of 
legitimate coercion or the ability to exercise authority over firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 
2014; Streeck and Schmitter, 1985). As an example, neo-institutional theorists explain that legal or 
government mandates are imposed over firms by means of authority rather than through pressures for 
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their voluntary compliance (Scott, 2014). Thus, firm and government relations are perceived as a cost 
or an institutional constraint on firms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2014). Neo-institutional 
theorists argue that firms depend on government as it can change the rules of the game that allow their 
existence and operations and has the power to expropriate firm assets (Scott, 2014). Such unavoidable 
dependence of firms on government, increases firms’ likelihood or need to comply with public policy 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991).  
Beyond government, neo-institutional theorists also view interest groups and the public 
opinion as part of the institutional context that exerts pressures on firms to conform to their 
requirements (Scott, 2014). To ensure legitimacy, firms need to gain acceptability and credibility from 
these wider stakeholders. Neo-institutional theorists argue that firms exhibiting culturally approved 
forms and activities, receiving support from normative authorities, and having approval from legal 
bodies, are more likely to survive due to their social fitness or perceived appropriateness, than firms 
lacking these evaluations (Deephouse et al., 2017; Meyer and Rowman, 1977). Therefore, conformity 
is viewed as useful to firms in terms of enhancing their likelihood of survival through a variety of 
rewards, such as increased prestige, legitimacy, and social support (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowman, 1977). Moreover, neo-institutional theorists have demonstrated 
that legitimacy and social support can exert influence on a firm’s viability, independent of its 
performance, or can even confer performance advantages to firms (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Baum and 
Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995).  
Altogether, on the one hand, neo-institutional theory has recognized that firms have the power 
to choose their direct responses to the institutional context. While on the other hand, government along 
interest groups and the public opinion are viewed as stakeholders that can exert institutional pressures 
on firms to conform to their requirements. Consequently, as firms expand the scope of their operations 
to various institutional contexts and become MNEs, their senior management often examines when 
and how to choose and deploy an engaged or a non-engaged approach to CPA in each host market. 
The aim of any of these approaches to CPA is to enable the viability of the MNE’s existence and 
operations, or even to confer performance advantages. To analyze this choice, we draw on 
Hirschman’s (1970) exit, voice, and loyalty framework to explain how the institutional context of a 
11 
 
host market can influence an MNE’s senior management to decide upon three options. These options 
entail choosing and deploying an engaged or a non-engaged approach to CPA as a direct response to 
the institutional context. 
The first option in Hirschman’s (1970) framework, is the option to exit. This option implies 
leaving or not entering a host market (Meyer et al., 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2005). To exercise exit, an 
MNE’s senior management chooses a non-engaged approach to CPA to evade engagement with the 
host government and disembed from host-government affairs (Heidenreich, 2012). This approach is 
deployed through the non-engaged political strategy of avoidance by avoiding operations in the host 
market. Thus, under exit, an MNE’s senior management neglects its right to have voice as the result of 
being either unable or unwilling to invest in efforts to influence host-country public policy (Boddewyn 
and Brewer, 1994). In contrast, the second option available to MNEs is to exert influence through 
voice, this implies staying in or entering a host market. To exercise voice, an MNE’s senior 
management chooses an engaged approach to CPA and deploys any combination of Hillman and 
Hitt’s (1999) engaged political strategies with the aim of shaping or modifying host-country public 
policy in ways favorable to its corporate interests. In doing so, an MNE engages with the host 
government and works on embedding itself in host-government affairs to have greater power to exert 
influence over host-country public policy. 
Hirschman’s (1970) options of exit and voice present a dichotomy. Whereas the third option 
available to MNEs, the option of loyalty, can affect the cost-benefit analysis of whether to choose exit 
or voice. The option of loyalty involves no exit and no voice, it implies staying in or entering a host 
market without exerting influence over host-country public policy. To exercise loyalty, since this 
option involves no voice, an MNE’s senior management chooses and deploys a non-engaged approach 
to CPA. The options of exit and loyalty both entail choosing a non-engaged approach to CPA, 
however, their key difference is that exit implies leaving or not entering a host market while loyalty 
implies staying in or entering a host market.  
Overall, extant CPA research has focused on an engaged approach to CPA to exercise the 
option of voice by staying in or entering a host market (Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Rodriguez et al., 
2006). Nonetheless, when confronting challenging host-country conditions, most previous studies 
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discuss the option to exit that involves leaving or not entering a host market by deploying a non-
engaged approach to CPA (Meyer et al., 2009; Rodriguez et al., 2005). Yet, other scholars argue that 
when an MNE’s senior management chooses to stay in or enter a host market, they may need to 
consider flying under the radar by evading engaged political strategies because engaging with the host 
government can increase an MNE’s visibility and risk exposure (Puck, Rogers, and Mohr, 2013). 
Despite this notion resonating with the option of loyalty, the question remains as to how can the 
institutional context of a host market influence when and how an MNE’s senior management chooses 
and deploys a non-engaged approach to CPA to exercise loyalty. To advance our understanding, the 
state of extant literature suggests we can build an intimate connection with empirical reality through 
inductive case study research, to better understand the mechanisms that underlie this approach 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007). Thus, we follow this research design, while focusing on a non-
engaged approach to CPA deployed through legal non-engaged political strategies. Therefore, 
circumvention or any illegal political strategies are beyond the scope of this study. Rather, based on 
empirical insight, we aim to refine our understanding of the acquiescence, compliance, and 
anticipatory strategies, that have been theoretically conceptualized in prior literature as legal non-
engaged political strategies. 
METHODS 
Research design 
We used an embedded design in our inductive case study (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009) in which 
within the case of Nutresa, we tracked and contrasted over a sixteen-year timeframe—1998 to 2013—
this MNE’s CPA choices in its five primary host markets: the United States, Costa Rica, Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Through an intimate and iterative connection between data and extant 
literature, we were interested in inductively developing accurate and parsimonious theory from case-
based empirical evidence (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Huff, 2009; Langley, 1999).  
Research context 
Nutresa was formed at the beginning of the 20th century, during Colombia’s industrial development. 
The company’s internationalization process began in the 1960’s with opportunistic exports. It was not 
until the 1990’s that these exports transformed into deliberate efforts to compete and grow in response 
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to economic liberalization. In 1995, Nutresa initiated the creation of wholly-owned distribution 
operations, and in 1996, the acquisition of production platforms in Latin America and beyond. Nutresa 
expanded primarily by acquiring companies with well-positioned brands and developed distribution 
operations. This internationalization process led Nutresa to own production and/or distribution 
operations in 15 countries on three continents: Latin America, North America, and Asia. Also, Nutresa 
exported to over 72 countries, reaching Europe, Africa, and Oceania. These achievements enabled 
Nutresa to be classified in 2007 by America Economia’s ranking of multilatinas, as Colombia’s most 
international multinational, and as one of the most important players in its industry in Latin America.  
 During the timeframe of our study—1998 to 2013—, Nutresa’s international scope and sales 
grew more than in any other period in its prior corporate history. International sales increased from 
USD $10.9 million to USD $1.1 billion, corresponding to approximately 4 percent of total sales in 
1998 and 34.3 percent of total sales—USD $3.2 billion—in 2013. Moreover, its profits multiplied 11-
fold while employees in host markets grew from 400 to 12,045, reaching a total number of 36,726 
employees worldwide. In this timeframe, the United States, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua came to be Nutresa’s five primary host markets by accounting for almost 60 percent of 
international sales and 20 percent of total sales. Insights from interviews with Nutresa’s senior 
managers indicated that, from 1998 to 2013, they had decided to stay in or enter these five primary 
host markets by choosing, in some cases, to engage, and in other cases, not to engage, with their host 
governments. They explained that, due to the strategic importance of these host markets, Nutresa 
dedicated significant time and resources to deliberately choosing and deploying the most customized 
and effective approach to CPA in each host market. Thus, within Nutresa, the CPA history of its five 
primary host markets from 1998 to 2013, provided the ideal research context for detailed fieldwork on 
MNE CPA choices in host markets (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2016).  
Data collection  
We used several data sources: (1) interviews, with informants from within and outside of Nutresa; (2) 
documents, including public annual reports, an internal report about the evolution of the number of 
employees versus sales in each host market, and classified records of the strategic tools developed by 
Nutresa for its operations in Venezuela; and (3) archives, including public media articles about the 
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chronology of events that occurred and Nutresa’s corporate political activities in each host market (see 
Table 2). We relied on interviews as the primary data source, with documents and archives serving as 
important triangulation and supplementary sources to enhance validity and reliability (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Yin, 2009). 
Insert Table 2 Here 
The primary data source included 60 in-depth semi-structured interviews that involved 
informants from different organizational levels, functional areas, and geographies within Nutresa, as 
well as outsiders such as industry and trade experts. We built our list of informants by, first, using 
Nutresa’s organizational chart and, second, including those who were referred by others as 
knowledgeable informants through snowball sampling. At the first organizational level, we 
interviewed board members, the CEO, the Vice-Presidents (VPs) of the business lines with operations 
in the host markets, the Chief Financial Officer (CFO), and the Vice-President of the General Council. 
At the second organizational level, we interviewed the General Managers of the operations in the host 
markets and informants from different functional areas who were located both at headquarters and in 
the host markets. These included International Business Directors, Logistics Managers, Marketing 
Directors, and the Coordinators of centralized treasury, auditing, legal assessment, human resources, 
risk management, innovation, and information technology (IT). At the operational level, we 
interviewed business level staff from the previously listed functions who were dispersed throughout 
headquarters and the host markets. Further, we included informants who were outsiders, such as the 
ex-CEO of a Venezuelan retail chain, the President of Colombia’s international trade association, and 
a former Colombian Ambassador to Venezuela. Overall, we were careful to cover the total population 
of knowledgeable informants within Nutresa, from the first level to the operational level, to ensure 
completeness and different hierarchical, functional, and geographical views. These informants had 
worked for Nutresa for an average of 17 years, providing extensive coverage of the sixteen-year 
timeframe—1998 to 2013. In addition, a mix of insiders and outsiders ensured our interview data 
provided both perspectives.  
We conducted our interviews by following Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) approach whereby our 
aim was to identify the chronology of political activities deployed by Nutresa in each of its primary 
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host markets. Political activities refer to the political tactics that make up the political strategies used 
by firms. Our purpose was to first, identify the political tactics and strategies deployed by Nutresa to 
uncover its chosen approaches to CPA and options in each host market. Second, to identify the 
underlying mechanisms that explained how the institutional context of a host market had influenced 
Nutresa’s senior management’s choice of when to deploy a non-engaged approach to CPA. Finally, to 
explain how Nutresa had deployed this approach to stay in or enter some of its primary host markets. 
We began conducting overview interviews, first, with the CEO, and then the board members 
and all other first level senior management. The aim was to capture a detailed overview of Nutresa’s 
CPA history in each of its primary host markets. We then conducted host market interviews with all 
other internal informants from within Nutresa. These interviews aimed to add detail and centered on a 
deeper understanding of the chronology of events that occurred and the political tactics deployed by 
Nutresa in each host market. We also conducted contextual interviews with outsiders that focused on 
providing an external view of the chronology of events and Nutresa’s CPA.  
To limit bias in our interview data, we used data collection approaches for increasing accuracy 
in retrospective research (Huber and Power; 1985; Golden, 1992; Miller, Cardinal, and Glick, 1997). 
A key approach was that we motivated the participation of informants by granting anonymity, which 
encourages candor. To build a realistic data structure, informants were motivated to equally share their 
positive and negative insights. We engaged with them by conducting face-to-face interviews to 
establish a closer relationship of trust. We also designed and pre-tested an interview protocol with in-
depth semi-structured questions and follow-up probes to ensure our questions were understood and 
answered completely while leaving time for open-ended questioning. Our interviews ranged from 45 
to 150 minutes in duration, were recorded and transcribed.  
Data analysis  
We followed three steps in our data analysis. The first step involved building individual case 
chronologies for each of the five primary host markets to create Nutresa’s CPA case history and 
identify its CPA choices. The second and third steps aimed to answer each of the research questions.  
The first step began by assembling for each host market a chronology of the events that 
occurred and the political tactics that Nutresa deployed by cross-matching the interviews with 
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documents and public media articles. We began elaborating these chronologies by first identifying in 
the public media articles the events that occurred and the documented political tactics that Nutresa had 
exercised vis-à-vis these events. Then, we coded the interviews to better understand these events, the 
political tactics deployed by Nutresa, and their approach—to engage, or not to engage, with host 
governments. Finally, we used the documents to complement our chronologies with additional public 
and internal firm data. Each of our final chronologies ranged from 10 to 58 pages and presented a 
longitudinal factual account of the most important events in each host market. This research approach 
follows Miles and Huberman’s (1994) suggestion of conducting case analysis through data time-
ordered visual displays of critical incidents. Once the chronologies were built, we crosschecked each 
one individually across key informants to enhance their validity and reliability. Altogether, these five 
chronologies comprised Nutresa’s CPA case history.  
Next, we used these five chronologies to conduct within and across host-market analysis to 
identify Nutresa’s CPA choices. Within each chronology, we focused our analysis on the political 
tactics that Nutresa deployed to uncover the political strategies, approaches to CPA, and options that 
its senior management chose in each host market. Then, across host markets, we contrasted similarities 
and differences. Finally, we compared our data with extant literature. We unexpectedly uncovered 
that, throughout the timeframe of this study, Nutresa’s senior management had deliberately chosen to 
deploy only one approach to CPA in each host market. In particular, Nutresa’s senior management had 
chosen to deploy an engaged approach to CPA in the United States and Costa Rica to exercise the 
option of voice by engaging with these host governments. In contrast, in Venezuela, Ecuador, and 
Nicaragua, Nutresa’s senior management had deliberately chosen to deploy a non-engaged approach 
to CPA to exercise the option of loyalty by staying in or entering these host markets, while not 
engaging with their host governments. 
In a second step of the analysis, we centered on how the institutional context of a host market 
can influence when an MNE’s senior management chooses a non-engaged approach to CPA. We 
categorized Nutresa’s host markets into two groups: one group of host markets in which Nutresa had 
chosen to deploy a non-engaged approach to CPA—comprising Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua—
and a second group of host markets in which Nutresa had chosen to deploy an engaged approach to 
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CPA—including the United Stated and Costa Rica. We contrasted similarities and differences among 
the underlying mechanisms in the institutional context that had influenced the choice of Nutresa’s 
approaches to CPA within and across both groups of host markets. Then, through iterative 
comparisons between data and theory, a framework emerged to identify and explain the underlying 
mechanisms in the institutional context of a host market that can influence when an MNE’s senior 
management chooses a non-engaged approach to CPA. 
In a third step of the analysis, we focused on how does an MNE deploy a non-engaged 
approach to CPA. We identified the host markets in which Nutresa had chosen to deploy a non-
engaged approach to CPA—Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. We contrasted similarities and 
differences among the non-engaged political tactics deployed by Nutresa in each of these host 
markets. Finally, we compared these non-engaged political tactics with extant literature to build, from 
empirical insight, a taxonomy of legal non-engaged political strategies that details how a non-engaged 
approach to CPA can be deployed to stay in or enter host markets. 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
Overall, our data analysis steps involved identifying initial concepts in the data and grouping 
them into categories or first-order concepts using informants’ terms. Next, using axial coding to 
compare similarities and differences in search of relationships between and among these categories to 
guide their assembling into second-order themes. Finally, gathering similar second-order themes into 
aggregate dimensions to build the basis of the framework and taxonomy that emerged (Gioia, Corley, 
and Hamilton, 2012). This process required using NVivo 9® software to enable intimate and iterative 
comparisons between theory and data, until reaching theoretical saturation—that is, a close match 
between theory and data (Gioia et al., 2012; Langley and Abdallah, 2011). A final data structure 
illustrated in Figure 1, summarizes how we progressed from raw data to second-order themes and 
aggregate dimensions in each of our data analysis steps. 
FINDINGS 
Based on the data structure in Figure 1 and as illustrated in Figure 2, there are four main dimensions to 
the framework that emerged from the case of Nutresa to explain how the institutional context of a host 
market can influence when and how an MNE chooses and deploys a non-engaged approach to CPA: 
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(1) political strategies, (2) approaches to CPA, (3) options in host markets, and (4) perceived host-
country political risk. We explain how these dimensions and their themes emerged and relate. 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
Political strategies, approaches to CPA, and options in host markets 
The dominant view in extant literature is that MNEs aim to exert influence over host-country public 
policy in ways favorable to their corporate interests (Hillman et al., 2004). To do so, they choose an 
engaged approach to CPA that implies staying in or entering a host market to exercise the option of 
voice (Hirschman, 1970) and deploy any combination of Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) engaged political 
strategies. In keeping with this view, we observed that in the United States, first and second level 
informants within Nutresa explained that this MNE’s senior and general managers used corporate 
presentations to lobby host-government authorities to make viable and successful Nutresa’s 
acquisition of Abimar Foods. Nutresa’s CEO disclosed that their aim in exerting influence over host-
government authorities was to become an accepted acquirer of Abimar Foods and access the financial 
aid that was offered to attract private investors. Through effective lobbying, Nutresa acquired Abimar 
Foods and gained the financial aid. In Costa Rica, first and second level informants within Nutresa 
explained that their operations were highly visible. This visibility translated into invitations from 
Costa Rican political parties for Nutresa to donate funds to their political campaigns. In response, 
documents validated that Nutresa provided equitable financial contributions to the most representative 
parties in the country. In addition, Nutresa participated in industry and trade associations in which its 
voice and stands were communicated to the Costa Rican government through collective lobby by 
representatives from these associations. Overall, Nutresa’s political tactics in the United States and 
Costa Rica aimed to exert influence over these host-countries’ public policy by engaging with their 
host governments. In accordance with Hillman and Hitt (1999), Nutresa’s engaged political tactics 
indicate that this MNE deployed the strategy of information in the United States and the strategies of 
financial incentive and information in Costa Rica. To deploy these engaged political strategies, 
Nutresa chose an engaged approach to CPA that implied staying in or entering these host markets to 
exercise the option of voice (Hirschman, 1970; Rodriguez et al., 2006).  
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Alternatively, neo-institutional theory suggests that MNEs can choose a non-engaged 
approach to CPA that can have the aim of avoiding or passively conforming to host-country public 
policy through the non-engaged political strategies of avoidance or acquiescence (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 
2014). However, the findings from this study show a different view. To stay in Venezuela and 
Ecuador and enter Nicaragua, Nutresa chose to deploy a non-engaged approach to CPA through non-
engaged political strategies that enabled this MNE to actively adapt rather than to passively conform 
to these host-countries’ public policy. To deploy this approach, Nutresa’s non-engaged political tactics 
show that this MNE used four legal non-engaged political strategies1, from which two resonate with 
the acquiescence or compliance and anticipatory strategies that have been theoretically conceptualized 
in prior literature (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008).  
Given that extant research focuses on firms’ engaging with government, Nutresa’s distinct 
CPA choices in its primary host markets lead us to ask: Why does an MNE’s senior management 
chooses to stay in or enter a host market by deploying a non-engaged over an engaged approach to 
CPA? Our data triangulation shows that Nutresa deliberately chose a non-engaged approach to CPA to 
stay in Venezuela and Ecuador and enter Nicaragua, because its senior management viewed that 
engaging with these host governments could increase Nutresa’s visibility and risk exposure. Prior 
research suggests that MNEs may need to consider flying under the radar because engaging with host 
governments can increase their visibility and risk exposure (Puck et al., 2013). For example, Nutresa’s 
senior managers explained that being visible in these host markets could motivate increases in 
operational costs, discriminatory policies, corruption requests, or expropriation. Indeed, research 
shows that host governments can use the power of legitimate coercion or the ability to exercise 
authority over firms in different ways (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Henisz and Zelner, 2010). 
Consequently, one of the consistent messages relayed by informants was that Nutresa never engaged 
with these host governments to try to exert influence over their public policy. As the CEO explained: 
‘Consciously, we decided that we should evade lobbying because of several reasons. One 
aspect we discussed at that time was that lobbying in these host markets would take us to 
scenes where we would be asked to engage in acts of corruption. Another aspect was that 
                                                          
1
 Nutresa’s non-engaged political tactics and strategies are explained in detail in a following section 
titled non-engaged political tactics and strategies to stay in or enter host markets. 
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lobbying could make us more visible, and visibility, could increase our chances of suffering 
discriminatory measures.’  
 
‘We decided not to influence or participate in these host governments. We wanted to stay 
under their radar.’  
 
Nutresa’s senior managers explained that in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua they 
discarded the alternative choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA that involved leaving or not 
entering these host markets through the option to exit. The reason why Nutresa discarded this 
alternative was that, in accordance with its long-term international strategy, these were all natural and 
strategic host markets where Nutresa aimed to sustain or start operations. Being loyal to its 
international strategy, Nutresa chose not to avoid but, rather, to actively adapt to these host-countries’ 
public policy. Likewise, Hirschman (1970) claims that where there is loyalty, the option to exit may be 
reduced. As one of Nutresa’s VPs explained: 
‘We decided to stick to our plans by actively working on finding ways to continue or start 
operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, instead of closing operations or delaying 
our entrance.’  
 
The influence of perceived host-country political risk on CPA  
The choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA is perceived in extant research as caused by, the non-
necessity of engaging due to the favorability of government policy toward the interests of the firm; 
restrictive regulatory conditions that impede a firm from participating in government affairs; or a 
firm’s inability to engage based on its relative lack of political resources and capabilities (Boddewyn 
and Brewer, 1994; Bonardi et al., 2006; Holburn and Zelner, 2010). In contrast, our data show that 
Nutresa’s choice to deploy a non-engaged approach to CPA in some host markets, was not caused by 
any of these antecedents. Senior managers clarified that in all primary host markets Nutresa had 
identified opportunities to improve the favorability of their host governments’ public policy. 
Concerning regulatory constraints, archival data validated that in all primary host markets, lobbying or 
information exchange, financial contributions, and constituency-building, were legal activities. Also, 
informants from all organizational levels within Nutresa and documents evidenced that this MNE had 
sufficient financial, human, organizational, and physical resources to enable its choice and deployment 
of an engaged approach to CPA in host markets. Moreover, concerning Nutresa’s political capabilities, 
senior managers and the knowledge management team explained that at the start of the timeframe of 
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this study, based on previous experience, Nutresa had substantially developed the capability to engage 
with host governments to exert influence over their public policy.  
From a neo-institutional perspective, an MNE is more likely to choose a non-engaged 
approach to CPA, involving avoiding or passively conforming to institutional pressures, when the 
institutional context offers high levels of environmental uncertainty (Oliver, 1991). In contrast, we 
observed that Nutresa’s senior management’s choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA, involved 
actively adapting rather than passively conforming to institutional pressures. However, in line with a 
neo-institutional perspective, Nutresa’s senior managers’ choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA 
was influenced by their perception of host-country political risk. As one VP explained: 
‘The political risk that we perceived to be challenging our operations in each of these host 
markets, was critical to our decisions on how to manage our relations with their host 
governments.’  
 
Nonetheless, despite host-country political risk relates to the notion of environmental uncertainty, 
perceived host-country political risk as antecedent of the choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA in 
host markets, has not been addressed through empirical work in prior research (Lux et al., 2011).  
Our data show that senior managers defined their perceived host-country political risk as ‘the 
perceived possibility of having policies frequently or discriminatorily changed to disrupt business 
and/or the possibility of suffering an expropriation by the host government.’ Previous research by 
Henisz and Zelner (2010) and Kobrin (1981) supports the notion that political risk involves both 
potential policy changes and potential expropriation. Senior managers emphasized that the different 
levels of their perceived host-country political risk explained their CPA choices in host markets. 
Through average ratings of their own perceived host-country political risk, we found that in the United 
States and Costa Rica they had perceived low host-country political risk (see Table 3, fourth column) 
that had influenced their choice of an engaged approach to CPA to exercise the option of voice. These 
ideas lead to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1a. The lower the level of an MNE’s senior management’s perceived host-country 
political risk, the more likely they will choose an engaged approach to CPA to exercise the 
option of voice. 
Insert Table 3 Here 
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In contrast, in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua senior managers had perceived high host-
country political risk (see Table 3, fourth column) that had influenced their choice of a non-engaged 
approach to CPA. In these three host markets, senior managers expected that an engaged approach to 
CPA could increase Nutresa’s visibility and risk exposure, as suggested by prior research (Puck et al., 
2013). While on the contrary, senior managers explained that being visible in the United States and 
Costa Rica could involve a lower risk exposure and even confer performance advantages (see Figure 
3). It is worth noting that in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, Nutresa’s choice of a non-engaged 
approach to CPA implied staying in or entering these host markets to exercise the option of loyalty. 
Senior managers highlighted that if Nutresa had lacked clarity in its decision of being loyal to its 
international strategy, they could have likely chosen a non-engaged approach to CPA in these host 
markets to exercise the option to exit. We summarize these ideas in the following proposition: 
Proposition 1b. The higher the level of an MNE’s senior management’s perceived host-
country political risk, the more likely they will choose a non-engaged approach to CPA to 
exercise the option of loyalty or the option to exit. 
Insert Figure 3 Here 
In addition, a key insight is that the level of Nutresa’s senior management’s perceived host-
country political risk that influenced its CPA choices in host markets, was not only based on risk 
arising from host-country political institutions, but also on risk emanating from the distance between 
Nutresa’s home and host-government relations. Few studies discuss the influence of home and host-
government relations on MNE CPA choices in host markets (Blumentritt, 2003; Blumentritt and Nigh, 
2002). As one VP explained: 
 ‘We not only perceive a host-country’s political risk as a reflection of its institutions. Also, the 
relations of our Colombian home government with the host government are critical.’ 
 
In the case of Nutresa, the risk arising from host-country political institutions was explained 
by informants through the high or low amounts of checks and balances that constrained a host-
government’s ability to change existing policies to affect businesses. Prior research has also related the 
checks and balances of political institutions with the level of political risk in a country (Henisz, 2000; 
Stevens et al., 2016). As a senior manager explained: 
‘Institutions in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua lack a high amount of checks and 
balances to restrict these host governments from quickly changing policies. Therefore, 
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institutions in these host markets set the scene for political risk to be high. The United States 
and Costa Rica are different; they have more institutional controls that tend to generate lower 
political risk.’ 
 
We observed that the risk arising from host-country political institutions was assessed by 
informants through public political risk ratings (see Table 3, second column). Unexpectedly, 
informants also included the distance between home and host-government relations in their 
assessments of the level of political risk that they perceived in a host market. Previous research 
suggests that including the distance between an MNE’s home and host-government relations, can 
provide a more realistic view to the MNE of the level of political risk that it can confront in a host 
market (Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002; De Villa, Rajwani, and Lawton, 2015; Ghemawat, 2001). Senior 
managers claimed that the distance in relations between Nutresa’s Colombian home and its host 
governments had been critical in shaping their final perceptions of each host-country’s political risk. 
This distance was described by informants as high or low, according to the level of differences in the 
political stances between governments. They explained that political relations between Colombia’s 
government and the host governments of Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua had been distant during 
more than a decade due to different reasons. Colombia’s political relations with Ecuador and 
Venezuela had mainly suffered frictions due to their differing political stances towards their 
understandings of democracy. Moreover, spillover effects from drug trafficking and illegal armed 
groups remained potential sources of friction in Colombia’s relations with these two countries (IHS 
Global Insight, 2012). With Nicaragua, differences in political stances towards their understandings of 
democracy were accompanied by a territorial dispute over San Andres, Providencia, Santa Catalina, 
and other territories, that has for decades affected the political relations between both countries. Thus, 
senior managers explained that the distance in relations between Nutresa’s Colombian home 
government and these three host governments was high. As they described: 
 ‘Venezuela used to be Nutresa’s most profitable market. When President Chavez came into 
power, he intended Colombia to unite with Venezuela in expanding its socialist project. 
Colombia’s former President Uribe resisted to promote Venezuela’s political regime. 
Consequently, the differing political stances between Venezuela and Colombia have since then 
distanced these governments by nurturing anti-Colombian feelings in Venezuela and the 
persecution of Colombian firms in Venezuela on behalf of this host government. Persecution of 





‘The Ecuadorian government supports Venezuela’s political regime. Consequently, again 
differing political stances between Ecuador and Colombia have distanced these governments. 
Moreover, the Colombian government was accused by the Ecuadorian government of a 
territorial intrusion when the Colombian army killed a guerrilla leader, Raul Reyes, in 
Ecuador. These political differences and frictions have translated into anti-Colombian 
feelings that have not triggered expropriations but the implementation of policies designed by 
the Ecuadorian government to discriminatorily interfere in the operations of Colombian firms 
in Ecuador.’  
 
‘With Nicaragua, Colombia has a distant relation mainly because of a territorial dispute over 
San Andres, Providencia, Santa Catalina, and other territories. This dispute has generated the 
imposition of a sovereignty tax on Colombian imports by the Nicaraguan government. This tax 
significantly deteriorated our conditions to do business with Nicaragua from Colombia. 
Besides, this country also supports the expansion of Venezuela’s socialist project and is not 
content with Colombia’s differing political stance.’  
 
It is worth noting that senior managers claimed that despite the level of risk arising from host-
country political institutions, when the distance between Nutresa’s home and host-government 
relations was high, this increased their level of perceived host-country political risk. As a VP claimed: 
‘If the Colombian government and a host government have distant relations, this is likely to 
increase political risk for our host-market operations.’  
 
These ideas lead us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2a. High distance between an MNE’s home and host-government relations is 
likely to increase the level of perceived host-country political risk that influences an MNE’s 
CPA choices. 
 
In contrast, Colombia’s government and the host governments of Costa Rica and the United 
States had closer political relations. On the one hand, Costa Rica shared with Colombia similar 
understandings of democracy that enabled both countries to be recognized as having some of the 
strongest democracies in Latin America (Brenes and Carneiro, 2013; IHS Global Insight, 2012). On 
the other hand, Colombia had traditionally been recognized as an ally of the United States in the Latin 
American region. Cooperation between these two countries had fostered collaboration in fighting drug 
trafficking and financial aid for Colombia. While, opposingly Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua 
have developed over the last decade a stronger discourse against ‘the Yankee imperialism’ (Vassolo, 
De Castro, and Gomez-Mejia, 2011). Senior managers explained that the aforementioned conditions 
enabled a low distance in relations between Nutresa’s Colombian home government and the host 
governments of Costa Rica and the United States. As two VPs described:  
‘Colombia and Costa Rica have close political relations that have enabled increasing trade 
and investment between the two countries. This has motivated Nutresa to do business in Costa 
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Rica and to engage with the Costa Rican government. In fact, for Nutresa, Costa Rica has 
become a strategic location from which to competitively supply a host market such as 
Nicaragua—where distant relations with Colombia impede Nutresa to have direct 
operations.’  
 
‘Colombia has traditionally been recognized as a close ally of the United States in the Latin 
American region, and these two countries have been characterized by a collaborative 
relationship. Close government relations have been an incentive for Nutresa to have 
operations in the United States and to aim to gain benefits by engaging with this government.’ 
 
Senior managers explained that despite the level of risk arising from host-country political 
institutions, when the distance between Nutresa’s home and host-government relations was low, this 
decreased their level of perceived host-country political risk. As a VP explained: 
‘We have experienced that when the Colombian government and a host government have close 
relations, this can mitigate the political risk that we face in that host market.’ 
 
This leads us to the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 2b. Low distance between an MNE’s home and host-government relations is likely 
to reduce the level of perceived host-country political risk that influences an MNE’s CPA 
choices.  
 
Table 3 summarizes how the distance between Nutresa’s home and host-government relations 
moderated the influence of Nutresa’s senior management’s perceived host-country political risk on its 
CPA choices in host markets. Prior research suggests that in a host country, MNEs from different 
home countries, may expect to be treated differently by the host government based upon their home 
and host-government relations (Blumentritt, 2003; Blumentritt and Nigh, 2002; Ghemawat, 2001). 
This may explain why our data show that the distance between an MNE’s home and host-government 
relations can influence MNE CPA choices in host markets through senior managers’ perception of 
host-country political risk.  
Finally, prior research has identified that there can be differences among CPA choices as per 
firms’ foreign versus domestic ownership (Getz, 1996; Hillman et al., 2004). However, in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua, we observed no differences in the CPA choices of firms by ownership, 
whereas we noted differences by their level of distance with these host or local governments. In the 
case of foreign MNEs, high distance between home and host-government relations was common 
among those that chose to stay in or enter these host markets through a non-engaged approach to CPA. 
Also, domestic firms or MNEs whose owners were distant and not perceived as allies of the local 
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government, frequently became political targets and, in most cases, deployed a non-engaged approach 
to CPA to stay in these markets. In contrast, foreign MNEs with low distance between their home and 
host-government relations and local firms or MNEs whose owners were close allies of the local 
government, generally chose an engaged approach to CPA.  
Non-engaged political tactics and strategies to stay in or enter host markets 
As extant research has underexplored how MNEs deploy a non-engaged approach to CPA to stay in or 
enter host markets (Hillman et al., 2004; Oliver 1991), we detail the non-engaged political tactics that 
composed the four legal non-engaged political strategies used by Nutresa to deploy this approach. It is 
worth emphasizing that in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, a triangulation of our data sources 
showed that although some of Nutresa’s non-engaged political tactics considered customers or 
competitors, all were triggered by and designed exclusively to address institutional conditions within 
the non-market environment, rather than, the market environment. Hence, Nutresa’s non-engaged 
political tactics were non-market responses. However, market components were integrated with non-
market components to effectively execute a non-engaged approach to CPA. This resonates with 
Baron’s (1995) assertion that the integration of market and non-market strategies is necessary for 
effectiveness. As a VP explained:  
‘In Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, we had to develop healthier products for customers 
to comply with government demands, monitor our prices against those of competitors to 
assure we were not the most expensive offer that could be accused of speculation, among 
many others. These actions were taken by Nutresa not to be in a more competitive position in 
these host markets but, rather, to actively adapt to their changing rules of the game in order to 
be able to sustain or start our operations.’ 
Based on the data structure in Figure 1, Nutresa’s first group of non-engaged political tactics 
in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua included completely evading influencing these host 
governments because engaging to exert influence was perceived as not being effective or as increasing 
Nutresa’s visibility and risk exposure. Instead, informants from all organizational levels within 
Nutresa claimed that this MNE pursued a neutral political stance by not assuming any political 
position. Further, senior managers explained that they focused on sustaining clear internal 
communications that centered on the MNE’s operations rather than on political stances. Also, General 
Managers of the operations in Venezuela and Ecuador revealed that Nutresa deployed locals to 
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represent this MNE in dealings with host governments, other political actors, and customers to ensure 
business negotiations and operations were not disrupted by rising anti-foreign feelings toward 
Colombians and Colombian MNEs. Archival data and informants outside of Nutresa validated that 
these anti-foreign feelings arose largely from the high distance between Nutresa’s home and these 
host-governments’ relations. Particularly in Venezuela, all data sources showed that Nutresa adopted a 
low public profile by not becoming a market leader but more of a market follower, via pricing its 
products moderately in consumer markets, because the Venezuelan government often pursued and 
sanctioned firms that offered the highest prices. In Venezuela, the CEO explained that Nutresa also 
decided, as a matter of corporate policy, to avoid the media. Senior managers widely believed that 
comments made by any of Nutresa’s employees could potentially be used to portray this MNE as 
adopting a political stance that could increase its chances of becoming a political target. 
Altogether, this group of non-engaged political tactics constitute the first non-engaged 
political strategy in our taxonomy: the low-visibility strategy, that ensures a minimal degree of general 
attention from political and social actors. This strategy details how MNE’s can deploy Puck and 
colleagues’ (2013) suggestion of flying under the radar of host governments. It aims to allow MNEs to 
minimize their public visibility and risk exposure, by not engaging with host governments, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of being the target of discriminatory policies or expropriation. The low-
visibility strategy targets host governments, the MNE’s employees, customers, and the media.  
A second group of non-engaged political tactics used by Nutresa included never to engage in, 
or tolerate acts of corruption as a matter of corporate policy. As the CEO explained: 
‘Our interest is promoting our operations within the legal framework by avoiding corruption.’  
Instead, Nutresa’s non-engaged approach to CPA involved rapidly complying with public policy. 
Second level informants explained that they worked on developing tools to ensure Nutresa’s 
operations rapidly complied with public policy and an adequate management of external inspections. 
For example, the General Managers of the distribution and production operations in Venezuela 
designed checklists to guide their operations in strict and rapid compliance with fast-changing public 
policies. Also, they created protocols to train employees on every step involved in the management of 
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inspections by the host government or any institution overseeing corporate regulatory compliance. 
These General Managers in Venezuela explained: 
‘I started to develop a checklist to guide our operations after being sanctioned with the 
temporary closure of our site for three days because of a minor non-compliance triggered by 
the absence of required documentation. After this event, I had to design a tool that would 
guarantee that the occurrence of a non-compliance would never interrupt operations again.’  
‘We created a protocols system that has helped us train our employees on how to receive 
inspections in the most effective way possible to not give any easy reasons for the Venezuelan 
government to affect our operations or expropriate our site.’  
Further, in Venezuela, General Managers and documents validated that Nutresa verified that it 
complied with paying what were considered by the host government as just prices to suppliers. This 
practice ensured that Nutresa would not be penalized due to what were referred to as unfair pricing 
policies. In addition, in all three host markets Nutresa devoted significant efforts to ensure that not 
only its operations, but also its products were compliant with public policy, as it regularly did in any 
market. However, in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, Nutresa was extra careful to rapidly comply 
because these host governments frequently changed the rules of the game and quickly searched for 
non-complying firms to impose sanctions. For instance, Nutresa quickly modified its product labels in 
Venezuela to comply with the newly passed law no. 39.658, ostensibly aimed at ‘the defense of the 
people for their access to goods and services’ and in practice, used to facilitate the state to expropriate 
the provision of goods and services considered vital to the public welfare. Moreover, Nutresa also 
modified its organizational structure and processes to rapidly comply with changing public policy, 
particularly in Ecuador and Venezuela. For example, in Ecuador, in a few days it directly hired around 
500 employees to rapidly comply with Constitutional Mandate no. 8 that prohibited outsourcing, and 
in Venezuela, it rapidly modified its process for buying U.S. dollars to meet fast-changing regulations.  
Overall, this second group of non-engaged political tactics used by Nutresa constitute a 
distinct non-engaged political strategy in our taxonomy: the rapid-compliance strategy, that entails 
high speed actions to obey the rules. This strategy resonates with the strategies of acquiescence or 
compliance that have been theoretically conceptualized in prior literature as involving the tactics of 
passively conforming to institutional pressures and complying with host-country public policy without 
aiming to shape or modify its contents (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Oliver, 1991). However, the 
29 
 
main difference between the strategies of acquiescence or compliance and the rapid-compliance 
strategy is the speed of compliance. We observed that to stay in or enter a host market of high political 
risk, MNEs require not only to comply, but to do so rapidly and completely to avoid sanctions, 
closure, or even expropriation. Prior research suggests that having approval from host governments 
and legal bodies by rapidly complying is useful to MNEs in terms of enhancing their likelihood of 
survival through legitimacy (DiMaggio, 1988; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowman, 
1977). Note that MNEs attempt to comply in all markets. Particularly, Nutresa complied in all of its 
primary host markets, including the United States and Costa Rica where it chose an engaged approach 
to CPA. However, MNEs in host markets where senior managers perceive high host-country political 
risk, as the case of Nutresa suggests, focus intensively on rapidly complying with fast-changing public 
policies. The reason why is because non-compliances are frequently used by host governments as 
rationales to disrupt MNE operations or expropriate firm assets. Thus, the rapid-compliance strategy is 
targeted at host governments or institutions that verify and police corporate regulatory compliance.   
As part of a third group of non-engaged political tactics, second and third level informants 
within Nutresa explained that, in other cases, this MNE modified its organizational structure and 
processes not to rapidly comply with public policy, but to efficiently sustain or start competitive 
operations. For instance, Nutresa created within its organizational structure new individual committees 
that studied and made decisions about operations in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua to ensure that 
these host-countries’ fast-changing rules were confronted through fast decision-making that aligned 
and incorporated headquarters, host-country managers, and staff. In addition, to supply Venezuela and 
Ecuador, Logistics Managers explained that Nutresa modified its logistics processes to ensure that 
products arrived safely at their destination despite political tensions. This approach translated into the 
definition of numerous new alternative routes and agreements with intermediaries. First level 
informants showed that Nutresa also worked on developing new ways to supply these restricted host 
markets by developing alternative production origins in countries from which products could be 
competitively imported. For example, a VP explained that Nutresa invested in operations in Peru to 
supply Venezuela and Ecuador. Likewise, Nutresa invested in operations in Costa Rica, from which it 
could competitively start operations in Nicaragua. As a VP described: 
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‘When we could not continuously supply Venezuela through our production operations in 
Colombia due to commercial restrictions imposed as a result of political differences, we 
invested in developing other production operations from where we could competitively supply 
this host market. Peru became the origin from where we supplied Venezuela, and then, 
Ecuador. Also, Costa Rica became the origin from where we started to supply Nicaragua.’  
In Venezuela, General Managers explained that Nutresa also reconfigured the origin of some 
of its inputs by substituting imports for local production to appear as a local value-adding MNE and 
increase its social support. Prior research explains that social support is important to MNEs as it can 
influence their viability (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Baum and Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 
1995). Further, the CEO and archival data disclosed that Nutresa changed Colombia as the country of 
origin in the legal structure of an investment in Venezuela to diminish the potential loss caused by an 
eventual expropriation. Nutresa made this modification because Costa Rica, the new country of origin 
for the investment, had closer political relations and an expropriation agreement with Venezuela. 
Although this agreement does not prevent expropriation, it guarantees a World Bank assurance that a 
just price is paid to the investor in the case of an expropriation. This agreement shows that a host 
government can treat the same operation differently due to its country of origin or home and host-
government relations (Blumenttrit, 2003; Blumenttrit and Nigh, 2002). 
Moreover, General Managers and staff in Venezuela reported that Nutresa acquired physical 
resources to overcome or manage challenging host-country institutional conditions. For example, in 
Venezuela, it acquired two energy plants to access energy when the government decided to interrupt 
electricity services. Also, Nutresa invested in designing replication systems that allowed up-dated 
access to the information of its operations in Venezuela through computer servers located in the 
United States to guarantee a safe second copy in the event of an expropriation. This shows that despite 
the widespread assumption that when there is high political risk MNEs should stop or divest their 
investments, some investments may be necessary to actively adapt to survive.  
Altogether, this third group of non-engaged political tactics constitute a third non-engaged 
political strategy in our taxonomy: the reconfiguration strategy, that involves re-arranging the MNE’s 
structure and processes for competitiveness. This strategy differs from the rapid-compliance strategy 
because, although one of its tactics is the same—modifying the MNE’s organizational structure and 
processes—the aims of this tactic differ within each strategy. In the rapid-compliance strategy, 
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modifying the MNE’s organizational structure and processes is intended to ensure the MNE’s rapid 
compliance with public policy, whereas in the reconfiguration strategy, its aim is to help the MNE to 
efficiently sustain or start competitive operations. Overall, the aim of the reconfiguration strategy is to 
align and adapt the MNE’s structure and processes to operate competitively in challenging host-
country institutional conditions. This strategy targets the non-market environment to which the MNE 
aims to adapt. 
A last group of non-engaged political tactics included adopting an anticipatory approach by 
carefully evaluating future investments to avoid increasing Nutresa’s exposure in these host markets. 
Also, documents and first level interviews within Nutresa showed that in reaction to challenging host-
country conditions, this MNE re-evaluated and accelerated its international expansion by further 
penetrating existing markets and more aggressively diversifying its host markets. In doing so, Nutresa 
conducted a study to determine which strategic markets it should invest in further and which new host 
markets it should approach to diversify. As the CEO claimed: 
‘A study helped us re-orient our international expansion according to the challenges we were 
facing at the time in some of our traditional international markets.’  
‘We should have done an acquisition in the United States years ago. However, it only 
happened when we were forced to find ways to mitigate the impact of the conditions we faced 
in some important host markets like Venezuela and Ecuador.’  
In addition, senior managers validated that Nutresa worked on monitoring government 
relations to assess the level of distance between its home and the host governments of Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua. It also worked on permanently monitoring these host countries’ institutional 
contexts by using human capital with knowledge such as political analysts, lawyers, and consultants. 
Nutresa’s aim was to identify what policy changes were evolving and to anticipate how to comply 
with up-coming policies or design ways to react to unpredictable political changes. As an example of 
anticipation, the General Manager in Ecuador explained that Nutresa had decided to exclude children 
from publicity in Ecuador since an up-coming law aimed to prohibit their appearance. Similarly, in 
line with policies pushing for healthier products in Ecuador, Nutresa invested significantly in 
initiatives to sustain and improve its competitive position by, for example, investing in the creation of 
improved ingredients that would allow it to offer healthier products demanded by forthcoming 
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nutrition policies. Operational staff also explained that Nutresa anticipatorily dedicated efforts to 
enhance its efficiency by reducing operational costs to overcome increasing operational expenses 
related to unpredictable changes in these host-countries’ policies, such as sudden significant increases 
to the tax on currency exit in Ecuador. Further, Nutresa focused on monitoring competitors’ prices and 
revising its own prices to assure the best possible profit while avoiding host-government sanctions for 
speculation. Likewise, Marketing Directors explained that traditional marketing was no longer their 
focus in these host markets. Instead, their aim to anticipate, enabled them to spend significant time and 
effort on identifying products that could be supplied competitively and profitably in accordance with 
changing policies in these host markets to have market presence without financial losses. As one VP 
explained: 
‘We want to have presence during difficult times in these host markets as the firms that 
manage to keep their brands in the minds of consumers will be rewarded when conditions 
improve.’  
Documents also showed that Nutresa conducted an extensive scanning exercise to map and 
analyze the potential impact of key interest groups on the MNE’s operations. General Managers and 
staff in Venezuela explained that Nutresa monitored these stakeholders’ needs and demands and 
designed ways to build positive community and labor relationships with them. These ways included 
the introduction of education programs and healthcare initiatives. By establishing and managing these 
relations, Nutresa increased its chances of being viewed as a local value-adding MNE and of 
mitigating conflicts arising from the interests of these stakeholders. Prior research claims that firms 
need to gain acceptability and credibility from these wider stakeholders to obtain their endorsement of 
legitimacy. Firms exhibiting culturally approved forms and activities, receiving support from 
normative authorities, and having approval from legal bodies are more likely to survive due to their 
social fitness or perceived appropriateness, than firms lacking these evaluations (Deephouse et al., 
2017; Meyer and Rowman, 1977). Moreover, neo-institutional theorists have demonstrated that 
legitimacy and social support can exert influence on a firm’s viability, independent of its performance, 
or can even confer performance advantages to firms (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Baum and Oliver, 1991; 
Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). In addition, in Nutresa’s financial statements, we found that it 
provisionally set the value of the investments that faced potential expropriation in these host markets 
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to mitigate the financial effect of their eventual expropriation. Finally, internal documents disclosed 
that Nutresa created plans to manage a potential expropriation by outlining the processes to be 
followed in the occurrence of such an event. 
This fourth group of non-engaged political tactics constitute the last non-engaged political 
strategy in our taxonomy: the anticipation strategy, that implies the prediction of public policy and 
analysis of interest groups to anticipate responses. This strategy resonates with the anticipatory 
strategy that has been theoretically conceptualized in prior literature as involving the tactic of 
anticipating potential changes in public policy to design early compliance mechanisms (Oliver and 
Holzinger, 2008). However, the findings of this study show that anticipating involves much more than 
designing early compliance mechanisms. An anticipation strategy aims to gain MNEs a first-mover 
advantage by anticipating future public policy directions and ways to gain social support to enhance 
MNEs’ legitimacy to survive. This strategy targets the non-market environment and is necessary for 
MNEs to enable their viability in host markets of high political risk. 
Insert Table 4 Here 
Table 4 captures evidence of these four legal non-engaged political strategies in Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Next, Table 5 shows a taxonomy of the four legal non-engaged political 
strategies that we have described. 
Insert Table 5 Here 
Finally, it is worth noting that in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Nicaragua—where Nutresa chose a 
non-engaged approach to CPA to stay in or enter these host markets by exercising the option of 
loyalty—our data indicated that the higher Nutresa’s senior managers rated their level of perceived 
host-country political risk, the more Nutresa used all of the four legal non-engaged political strategies 
to stay in or enter these host markets (see Table 6). This leads us to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. When an MNE’s senior management chooses a non-engaged approach to CPA 
to exercise the option of loyalty, the higher the level of their perceived host-country political 
risk, the more likely the MNE will increase its use of the low-visibility strategy, rapid-
compliance strategy, reconfiguration strategy, and anticipation strategy. 
 




In this study, we analyzed how the institutional context of a host market can influence when and how 
an MNE’s senior management chooses and deploys a non-engaged over an engaged approach to CPA. 
Despite some scholars arguing that MNEs may need to consider flying under the radar by evading 
engaged political strategies, because engaging with the host government can increase an MNE’s 
visibility and risk exposure (Puck et al., 2013), the question of when and how an MNE’s senior 
management chooses and deploys a non-engaged approach to CPA is still not well understood. 
Differing from other studies that discuss the choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA to exercise the 
option to exit that implies leaving or not entering a host market (Meyer et al., 2009; Rodriguez et al., 
2005), we analyzed when and how a non-engaged approach to CPA is chosen and deployed to stay in 
or enter a host market by exercising the option of loyalty. Overall, the extant literature does not 
appropriately conceptualize the trade-offs between an engaged and a non-engaged approach to CPA. 
We explained that when an MNE’s senior management decides to stay in or enter a host market of 
high political risk, managing political risk may not only involve engaging with the host government, 
or not engaging, and rather, passively conforming to its public policy. We showed how an MNE can 
create longer term value by actively adapting to host-country public policy through a non-engaged 
approach to CPA to exercise the option of loyalty. 
To better understand the choice and deployment of a non-engaged approach to CPA to 
exercise the option of loyalty, we conducted a fine-grained analysis of the case of Nutresa. The 
analysis results in two novel insights. First, we identified that when an MNE’s senior management 
perceives high host-country political risk, it is more likely to choose a non-engaged approach to CPA 
to exercise the option of loyalty or the option to exit. Further, we explained how the influence of 
perceived host-country political risk on MNE CPA choices is moderated not only by risk arising from 
host-country political institutions, but also by risk emanating from the distance between an MNE’s 
home and host-government relations. We identified that a high level of distance between an MNE’s 
home and host-government relations is likely to increase an MNE’s senior management’s perceived 
host-country political risk. Consequently, senior management is more likely to choose a non-engaged 
approach to CPA in the host market. Second, we developed a nuanced conceptualization of approaches 
to CPA that challenges the notion that not engaging with government only involves avoiding or 
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passively conforming to institutional pressures through the strategies of avoidance or acquiescence. 
We proposed that a non-engaged approach to CPA to stay in or enter host markets of high political 
risk, requires active adaptation rather than passive conformity. We detailed four legal non-engaged 
political strategies to deploy this approach: low-visibility, rapid-compliance, reconfiguration, and 
anticipation. 
Theoretical contributions 
From the analysis, we offer several contributions to the extant literature. First, we extend the neo-
institutional theory (DiMaggio, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014) and the antecedents of CPA choices 
literatures (Hillman et al., 2004; Lux et al., 2011) by theoretically classifying and explaining an 
MNE’s senior management’s perceived host-country political risk as an antecedent of MNE CPA 
choices in host markets. The identification of this antecedent advances our understanding of how 
institutional factors influence senior managers’ perceptions, and thereby, their choice and deployment 
of an effective approach to CPA. Further, we explained how the level of distance between an MNE’s 
home and host-government relations has a moderating effect on the level of perceived host-country 
political risk that influences an MNE’s CPA choices. Prior research has focused on the influence of 
the host country on the operations of host MNEs (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016) or on the influence of the 
home country by studying corruption (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006), weak institutions (Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Genc, 2008), government influence on the economy (García-Canal and Guillén, 2008), and 
institutional constraints (Holburn and Zelner, 2010). We extend research about the impact of an 
MNE’s home country on its corporate political behavior in various institutional contexts (Blumentritt 
and Nigh, 2002; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2011), by identifying that an MNE can make different CPA choices 
in host markets based on the level of distance in relations between its home and host-governments. 
Second, we challenge the notion that not engaging with government only involves avoiding or 
passively conforming to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991; Scott, 2014). We explained that when an 
MNE’s senior management perceives high host-country political risk, it is more likely to choose a 
non-engaged approach to CPA that requires either avoiding or actively adapting to host-country public 
policy. We detailed how actively adapting to host-country public policy can be deployed through four 
legal non-engaged political strategies. These are: the low-visibility strategy, that explains how MNE’s 
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can deploy Puck and colleagues’ (2013) suggestion of flying under the radar of host governments; the 
rapid-compliance strategy, that differs by the speed of compliance from the acquiescence or 
compliance strategies that have been theoretically conceptualized in prior literature; the 
reconfiguration strategy, that involves re-arranging the MNE’s organizational structure and processes 
for competitiveness; and the anticipation strategy, that differs from the anticipatory strategy that has 
been theoretically conceptualized in prior research, by showing that beyond designing early 
compliance mechanisms, its aim is to gain MNEs a first-mover advantage by anticipating future public 
policy directions and ways to gain social support to enhance legitimacy. Overall, the identification of 
these four, distinctive and legal non-engaged political strategies, refines our understanding of how a 
non-engaged approach to CPA to exercise the option of loyalty can be deployed (Boddewyn and 
Brewer, 1994; Oliver, 1991; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Shaffer, 1995). Further, these strategies 
amplify the portfolio of political strategies available for MNEs, while showing that not engaging with 
host governments can involve more than avoidance or acquiescence. 
Implications for practice 
Our findings are also useful to management practice. First, in raising senior managers’ awareness of 
the importance of assessing how their MNE’s home country—particularly the distance between home 
and host-government relations—can shape their perceived host-country political risk, and influence 
their CPA choices in host markets. When the distance between their home and host-government 
relations is low, it can be easy and beneficial for senior managers to choose to engage with the host 
government. In contrast, when the distance between their home and host-government relations is high, 
to engage with the host government can increase their MNE’s visibility and risk exposure. Under such 
circumstances, not to engage with the host government can be a choice to consider. 
Second, senior managers can also reflect upon their MNE’s assessment exercises of host-
country political risk. We argue that these exercises should not be exclusively based on the study of 
public political risk ratings. As our findings and prior work (John and Lawton, 2017; Kobrin, 1981) 
suggest, senior managers within an MNE can provide the best insights on exactly how political risk 
can affect an MNE’s operations in a host market. Hence, assessments of public political risk ratings, 
by themselves, fall short. This is, in part, because they lack an assessment of the distance between an 
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MNE’s home and host-government relations, while we observed that this distance matters to MNE 
CPA choices and can be assessed by senior managers. 
Third, the most important implication of this study for management practice is to highlight 
that MNEs have the option of loyalty. A positive aspect of this option is that MNEs can stay in or enter 
host markets by minimizing the impact of costs related to changes in host-country public policy and 
potential host-government interventions. Nevertheless, particularly in an era characterized by the 
growth in authoritarian regimes and the decline of liberal democracies, the option of loyalty suggests 
that MNEs can survive, and even be profitable, by flying under the radar of host governments and not 
being a force for the internationalization of the rule of law and international standards and norms. 
Finally, the framework and taxonomy that we offer as walking sticks (Hafsi and Thomas, 
2005) can help senior managers understand when and how, to choose and deploy a non-engaged 
approach to CPA to exercise the option of loyalty. We clarify that our aim is not to advocate the 
exercise of this option. However, an acceleration of international expansion is increasingly exposing 
MNEs to different host markets, some of high political risk. Thus, the ability to stay in or enter host 
markets with high political risk by deploying a non-engaged approach to CPA, can become a source of 
advantage in managing not only operations in these host markets, but also in managing the diversity of 
institutional contexts across host markets to internationalize more widely (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016).  
Limitations and future research  
This study has limitations that we hope future research will address. Most significantly, we focus on 
five host markets in the Americas, which raises the question of whether host markets in other 
geographies in which MNEs perceive high host-country political risk can show evidence of similar 
CPA choices and non-engaged political strategies. Therefore, future studies can further explore the 
combinations of CPA choices and non-engaged political strategies in different locations and across 
time. Future work can also focus on other industries and use quantitative datasets to broaden our 
knowledge of MNE CPA choices, and particularly of the choice of a non-engaged approach to CPA. 
Finally, another interesting future research avenue can be to elaborate on the corporate political 
behavior of foreign and domestic firms by their level of distance with host or local governments, to 




We appreciate the constructive feedback received from Co-Editor, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, and from 
our anonymous reviewers. We wish to thank J-P Bonardi, Joseph Clougherty, Jonathan Doh, 
Constance Helfat, Ann Langley, Jonas Puck, Richard Vanden Bergh, and Richard Whittington for 
their comments on previous versions of this paper. Our thanks to the audience and conference 
reviewers at the 2013 SMS Annual Conference in Atlanta, where an earlier version of this paper was 
nominated for the Best Conference PhD Paper Prize; the 2014 AIB Annual Meeting in Vancouver; the 
2014 AIB-LAT Conference in Colombia, where a previous version of this paper won the Best Paper 
Award; and the 2015 AoM Annual Meeting in Vancouver. We also gratefully acknowledge the access 




Aplin, J., & Hegarty, H. (1980). Political influence: Strategies employed by organizations to impact 
legislation in business and economic matters. Academy of Management Journal, 23, 438–450.  
Bansal, P., & Roth, K. (2000). Why companies go green: A model of ecological responsiveness. 
Academy of Management Journal, 43, 717–736.  
Baron, D. P. 1995. Integrated strategy: Market and nonmarket components. California Management 
Review, 37(2), 47–65.  
Baum, J. A. C., & Oliver, C. (1991). Institutional linkages and organizational mortality. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 36, 187–218.  
Baysinger, B. D. (1984). Domain maintenance as an objective of business political strategies: An 
extended typology. Academy of Management Review, 9, 248–258.  
Blumentritt, T. P. (2003). Foreign subsidiaries’ government affairs strategies: The influence of 
managers and resources. Business & Society, 42, 202–233.  
Blumentritt, T. P., & Nigh, D. (2002). The integration of subsidiary political activities in multinational 
corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 33, 57–77.  
Boddewyn, J. J., & Brewer, T. L. (1994). International-business political behavior: New theoretical 
directions. Academy of Management Review, 19, 119–143.  
Boddewyn, J. J., & Doh, J. P. (2011). Global strategy and the collaboration of MNEs, NGOs, and 
governments for the provisioning of collective goods in emerging markets. Global Strategy 
Journal, 1, 345–361.  
Bonardi, J. P., Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. D. (2005). The attractiveness of political markets: 
Implications for firm strategy. Academy of Management Review, 30, 397–413.  
Bonardi, J. P., Holburn, G. L. F., & Vanden Bergh, R. G. (2006). Nonmarket strategy performance: 
Evidence from U.S. electric utilities. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 1209–1228.  
Brenes, E. R., & Carneiro, J. (2013). Latin American firms competing in the global economy. Journal 
of Business Research, 67, 831–836.  
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2006). Who cares about corruption? Journal of International Business Studies, 
37, 807–822.  
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2011). Global strategy and global business environment: The direct and indirect 
influences of the home country on a firm’s global strategy. Global Strategy Journal, 1, 382–386.  
Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2016). Multilatinas as sources of new research insights: The learning and escape 
drivers of international expansion. Journal of Business Research, 69, 1963–1972.  
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Andersson, U., Brannen, M. Y., Nielsen, B. B., & Reuber, A. R. (2016). Can I 
trust your findings? Ruling out alternative explanations in international business research. Journal 
of International Business Studies, 47, 881–897.  
Cuervo-Cazurra, A., & Genc, M. (2008). Transforming disadvantages into advantages: Developing 
country MNEs in the least developed countries. Journal of International Business Studies, 39, 957–
979.  
Deephouse, D. L. (1996). Does isomorphism legitimate? Academy of Management Journal, 39, 1024–
1039.  
Deephouse, D. L., Bundy, J., Tost, L. P., & Suchman, M. C. (2017). Organizational legitimacy: Six 
key questions. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, T. B. Lawrence, & R. E. Meyer (Eds.), The Sage 
handbook of organizational institutionalism (pp. 27–54). London: Sage. 
39 
 
De Villa, M. A., Rajwani, T., & Lawton, T. (2015). Market entry modes in a multipolar world: 
Untangling the moderating effect of the political environment. International Business Review, 24, 
419–429.  
DiMaggio, P. J. (1988). Interest and agency in institutional theory. In L. G. Zucker (Ed.), Institutional 
patterns and organizations: Culture and environment (pp. 3–21). Cambridge: Ballinger. 
DiMaggio, P. J., & Powell, W. W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Collective rationality and 
institutional isomorphism in organizational fields. American Sociological Review, 48, 147–160.  
Dinero. (2016, August 18). El Grupo Empresarial Antioqueño es sinónimo del poder paisa. Retrieved 
from http://www.dinero.com/edicion-impresa/caratula/articulo/el-grupo-empresarial-antioqueno-y-
su-reestructuracion-en-sus-negocios/228942. 
Edmondson, A. C., & McManus, S. E. (2007). Methodological fit in management field research. 
Academy of Management Review, 32, 1155–1179.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management 
Review, 14, 532–550.  
Eisenhardt, K. M., & Graebner, M. E. (2007). Theory building from cases: Opportunities and 
challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 25–32.  
Evans, D. (1988). Oil PACs and aggressive contribution strategies. The Journal of Politics, 50, 1047–
1056.  
García-Canal, E., & Guillén, M. (2008). Risk and the strategy of foreign location choice in regulated 
industries. Strategic Management Journal, 29, 1097–1115.  
Getz, K. (1993). Selecting corporate political activities. In B. Mitnick (Ed.), Corporate political 
agency (pp. 152–170). Newbury: Sage. 
Getz, K. (1996). Politically active foreign-owned firms in the US: Elephants or chickens? In D. 
Woodward & D. Nigh (Eds.), Beyond us and them: Foreign ownership and US competitiveness 
(pp. 231–253). Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Ghemawat, P. (2001). Distance still matters: The hard reality of global expansion. Harvard Business 
Review, 79(8), 137–147.  
Gioia, D. A., Corley, K. G., & Hamilton, A. L. (2012). Seeking qualitative rigor in inductive research: 
Notes on the Gioia methodology. Organizational Research Methods, 16, 15–31.  
Golden, B. R. (1992). The past is the past—or is it? The use of retrospective accounts as indicators of 
past strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 35, 848–860.  
Grier, K. B., & Munger, M. C. (1993). Comparing interest group PAC contributions to House and 
Senate incumbents, 1980–1986. The Journal of Politics, 55, 615–643.  
Hafsi, T., & Thomas, H. (2005). The field of strategy: In search of a walking stick. European 
Management Journal, 23, 507–519.  
Heidenreich, M. (2012). The social embeddedness of multinational companies: A literature review. 
Socio-Economic Review, 10, 549–579.  
Henisz, W. J. (2000). The institutional environment for multinational investment. Journal of Law, 
Economics, and Organization, 16, 334–364.  
Henisz, W. J., & Zelner, B. A. (2010). The hidden risks in emerging markets. Harvard Business 
Review, 88(4), 88–95.  
Hillman, A. J., & Hitt, M. A. (1999). Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of approach, 
participation, and strategy decisions. Academy of Management Review, 24, 825–842.  
Hillman, A. J., Keim, G. D., & Schuler, D. (2004). Corporate political strategies: A review and 
research agenda. Journal of Management, 30, 837–857.  
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: Responses to decline in firms, organizations, and 
states. United States: Harvard University Press. 
Holburn, G. L. F., & Zelner, B. (2010). Political capabilities, policy risk, and international investment 
strategy: Evidence from the global electric power generation industry. Strategic Management 
Journal, 31, 1290–1315.  
Huber, G. P., & Power, D. J. (1991). Retrospective reports of strategic-level managers: Guidelines for 
increasing accuracy. Strategic Management Journal, 6, 171–180.  
Huff, A. S. (2009). Designing research for publication. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
IHS Global Insight. (2012). Political risk ratings. (accessed 3 March 2012). 
40 
 
John, A., & Lawton, T. (2017). International political risk management: Perspectives, approaches and 
emerging agendas. International Journal of Management Reviews.  
Keim, G. D., & Baysinger, B. D. (1988). The efficacy of business political activity: Competitive 
considerations in a principal agent context. Journal of Management, 14, 163–180.  
Kobrin, S. J. (1981). Political assessment by international firms: Models or methodologies? Journal of 
Policy Modeling, 3, 251–270.  
Kobrin, S. J. (2015). Is a global nonmarket strategy possible? Economic integration in a multipolar 
world order. Journal of World Business, 50, 262–272.  
Kostova, T., Roth, K., & Dacin, M. T. (2008). Institutional theory in the study of multinational 
corporations: A critique and new directions. Academy of Management Review, 33, 994–1006.  
Langley, A. (1999). Strategies for theorizing from process data. Academy of Management Review, 24, 
691–710.  
Langley, A., & Abdallah, C. (2011). Templates and turns in qualitative studies of strategy and 
management. In D. Bergh & D. Ketchen (Eds.), Building methodological bridges: Research 
methodology in strategy and management (pp. 201–235). Bingley: Emerald Group. 
Lawton, T., McGuire, S., & Rajwani, T. (2013). Corporate political activity: A literature review and 
research agenda. International Journal of Management Reviews, 15, 86–105.  
Lux, S., Crook, T. R., & Woehr, D. J. (2011). Mixing business with politics: A meta-analysis of the 
antecedents and outcomes of corporate political activity. Journal of Management, 37, 223–247.  
Masters, M., & Keim, G. (1985). Determinants of PAC participation among large corporations. The 
Journal of Politics, 47, 1158–1173.  
Meyer, K. E., Estrin, S., Bhaumik, S. K., & Peng, M. W. (2009). Institutions, resources, and entry 
strategies in emerging economies. Strategic Management Journal, 30, 61–80.  
Meyer, J. W., & Rowan, B. (1977). Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and 
ceremony. American Journal of Sociology, 83, 340–363.  
Meyer, J. W., & Scott, W. R. (1983). Centralization and the legitimacy problems of local government. 
In J. W. Meyer & W. R. Scott (Eds.), Organizational environments: Ritual and rationality 
(pp.199–215). Sage: Beverly Hills. 
Meznar, M., & Nigh, D. (1995). Buffer or bridge? Environmental and organizational determinants of 
public affairs strategies in American firms. Academy of Management Journal, 38, 975–996.  
Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative data analysis: An expanded sourcebook. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Miller, C. C., Cardinal, L. B., & Glick, W. H. (1997). Retrospective reports in organizational research: 
A reexamination of recent evidence. Academy of Management Journal, 40, 189–204.  
Oberman, W. (1993). Strategy and tactic choice in an institutional resource context. In B. Mitnick 
(Ed.), Corporate political agency (pp. 301–324). Newbury: Sage.  
Oliver, C. (1991). Strategic responses to institutional processes. Academy of Management Review, 16, 
145–179.  
Oliver, C., & Holzinger, I. (2008). The effectiveness of strategic regulatory management: A dynamic 
capabilities framework. Academy of Management Review, 33, 496–520.  
Perrow, C. (1985). Review essay: Overboard with myth and symbols. American Journal of Sociology, 
91, 151–155.  
Powell, W. W. (1985). The institutionalization of rational organizations. Contemporary Sociology, 14, 
564–566.  
Puck, J. F., Rogers, H., & Mohr, A. T. (2013). Flying under the radar: Foreign firm visibility and the 
efficacy of political strategies in emerging economies. International Business Review, 22, 1021–
1033.  
Rodriguez, P., Siegel, D. S., Hillman, A. J., & Eden, L. (2006). Three lenses on the multinational 
enterprise: Politics, corruption, and corporate social responsibility. Journal of International 
Business Studies, 37, 733–746.  
Rodriguez, P., Uhlenbruck, K., & Eden, L. (2005). Government corruption and the entry strategies of 
multinationals. Academy of Management Review, 30, 383–396.  
Schuler, D., & Rehbein, K. (1997). The filtering role of the firm in corporate political involvement. 
Business & Society, 36, 116–139.  
41 
 
Scott, W. R. (2014). Institutions and organizations: Ideas, interests, and identities (4th ed.). Thousand 
Oaks: Sage. 
Shaffer, B. (1995). Firm-level responses to government regulation: Theoretical and research 
approaches. Journal of Management, 21, 495–514.  
Stevens, C. E., Xie, E., & Peng, M. W. (2016). Toward a legitimacy-based view of political risk: The 
case of Google and Yahoo in China. Strategic Management Journal, 37, 945–963.  
Streeck, W., & Schmitter, P. C. (1985). Community, market, states—and associations? The 
prospective contribution of interest governance to social order. In W. Streeck & P. C. Schmitter 
(Eds.), Private interest government: Beyond market and state (pp. 1–29). Beverly Hills: Sage.  
Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. Academy of 
Management Review, 20, 571–610.  
Vassolo, R. S., De Castro, J. O., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2011). Managing in Latin America: Common 
issues and a research agenda. Academy of Management Perspectives, 25(4), 22–36.  
Vogel, D. (1996). The study of business and politics. California Management Review, 38(3), 146–165.  
Weidenbaum, M. (1980). Public policy: No longer a spectator sport for business. Journal of Business 
Strategy, 1(1), 46–53.  




Table 1 Approaches to CPA and political strategies
 
 
Engaged approach to CPA Non-engaged approach to CPA 
   
Aim To enable MNEs to influence host-country public policy To enable MNEs to avoid or conform to host-country public policy 
 
  
Relation with the host-government Involves engaging with the host-government Involves evading engagement with the host-government 
 
  
Political strategies Information  Avoidance 





   
View of compliance Involves complying with host-country public policy  
while searching to shape or modify its contents in  
ways favorable to the MNE’s corporate interest 
Involves complying with host-country public policy  
without aiming to shape or modify its contents 
   
Other labels Public policy shaping (Weidenbaum, 1980) 
Bargaining behavior (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994) 
Political buffering (Blumentritt, 2003; Meznar and Nigh, 1995) 
Proactive CPA (Hillman et al., 2004) 
Passive reaction, positive anticipation (Weidenbaum, 1980) 
Non-bargaining behavior (Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994) 
Political bridging (Blumentritt, 2003; Meznar and Nigh, 1995) 
Reactive CPA (Hillman et al., 2004) 
   
   
   
   




Table 2 Description of data
 
Data sources Description Number Total 
Interviewees  Within Nutresa 
  
 - First level Board members  2 60 
 
 CEO   1  
 
 VPs of the business lines with operations in the host markets  8  
 
 CFO  1  
 
 VP of the General Council  1  
 
 
   
 
 
- Second level General Managers of operations in the host markets  5  
 
 International Business Directors   5  
 
 Logistics Managers  7  
 
 Marketing Directors  7  
 







- Operational level Other business level staff  10  




Outsiders Ex-CEO of a Venezuelan retail chain  1  
 
 President of Colombia’s international trade association  1  
 
 Former Colombian Ambassador to Venezuela  1  
 
 
   






Internal Report about the evolution of the number of employees versus sales in each host market between 1998–2013 1 
 
 




   
Archives Public Media articles about the events that occurred in each host market between 1998–2013 60 63 
    Media articles about Nutresa’s corporate political activities in each host market between 1998–2013 3 
 
    
 
 





Figure 1 Data structure   
1st Order Concepts
2nd Order Themes Aggregate Dimensions
Perceived host-country 
political risk


















- Evading influencing host governments
- Pursuing a neutral political stance
- Sustaining clear internal communications that center on operations rather than on political stances
- Deploying locals to represent the MNE when interacting with host governments, other political actors, and customers
- Adopting a low public profile and avoiding the media
- Not engaging in acts of corruption
- Developing tools to assure the MNE’s operations rapidly comply with public policy and an adequate management of external
inspections
- Paying just prices to suppliers to comply with pricing policies
- Ensuring the MNE’s products rapidly comply with changing public policy
- Modifying the MNE’s organizational structure and processes to rapidly comply with public policy
- Modifying the MNE’s organizational structure and processes, not to rapidly comply with public policy, but to efficiently sustain or
start competitive operations
- Developing new ways to supply a restricted host market
- Substituting imports in a host operation for local production to appear as a local value-adding MNE
- Changing the country of origin in the legal structure of a foreign investment
- Acquiring physical resources to overcome or manage challenging host-country institutional conditions
- Carefully evaluating future investments
- Further penetrating and diversifying host markets
- Monitoring home and host-government relations
- Monitoring the host country’s institutional context by using human capital with knowledge
- Anticipating possibilities to comply with the host-country’s potential up-coming public policies
- Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve the future competitive position of the MNE
- Reducing operational costs to overcome increasing operational expenses related to the host-country’s public policies
- Revising prices to maintain competitiveness and assure the best possible profit
- Identifying products that can be profitably supplied in accordance with the host-country’s changing public policies
- Mapping and analyzing the potential impact of key interest groups on the MNE’s operations to design ways to manage these
relations
- Provisioning in financial statements the value of the investments that face potential expropriation
- Creating plans to manage a potential expropriation
- Not engaging with the host government
- Conforming to host-country public policy
- Avoiding host-country public policy
- Engaging with the host government
- Exerting influence over host-country public policy
- Engaging with the host government
- Staying in or entering the host market
- Not engaging with the host government
- Staying in or entering the host market
- Not engaging with the host government
- Leaving or not entering the host market
- High amount of checks and balances that constrain a host-government’s ability to change existing policies
- Low amount of checks and balances that constrain a host-government’s ability to change existing policies
- High differences in political stances between home and host-governments





















































Table 3 Nutresa’s CPA choices in host markets 
 




Distance b/w Nutresa’s 



















‘When Colombia has close relations with a host government, this is ideal for our 
business. In such cases, the host government is not that much of a threat to our 
operations. In fact, we can lobby the host government through associations or 
even directly. We feel free to express our stands and to design different legal ways 






   




    
Venezuela 4.0 High 5 Loyalty Non-engaged ‘When a host government has distant political relations with the Colombian 
government—that is our home-government—we find Nutresa can easily become a 
political target for such host government. In that case, the host government may 
frequently aim to disrupt our business to affect our home-government, 
particularly when both governments have substantial political differences. We 
don’t engage with this type of host governments; we don’t want to be visible in 
such host markets. Rather, we focus on adapting to the high political risk that they 
entail for our operations so that we can do business.’ [VP] 
 
 
       




   





   
  * The ratings in this column follow a scale from 1 to 5, being 1 the lower score and 5 the higher score. A rating of 1, means this country has a strong, well-developed, and effective democracy that ensures a very high level of 
political stability. Changes of government involve broad policy continuity. A rating of 2, means political institutions are strong. More extreme opposition is generally contained within the political system. Any changes of 
government take place through constitutional means. The business environment remains largely unaffected by the political system. A rating of 3, means this country has a less mature democratic system or a stable authoritarian 
system. Political stability cannot be guaranteed in the longer term because political institutions lack authority or are evolving. Uncertainty in the political system tends to make business time-consuming for investors. A rating of 
4, means this country has a repressive and/or highly unstable political regime. Individuals can expect little protection from the constitution or state. Government changes are traumatic and unconstitutional. Political institutions 
are highly vulnerable and may periodically cease to function effectively. A rating of 5, means this country may be in the grip of a civil or international war. Alternatively, the country is facing a major insurgency and law and 
order has broken down (IHS Global Insight, 2012). 
  ** The ratings in this column follow a scale from 1 to 5, being 1 the lower score and 5 the higher score. Ratings between 1 and 2.5 indicate low host-country political risk while ratings between 3.5 and 5 indicate high host-    





















Risk exposure of engaging 




United States Costa Rica
48 
 
Table 4 Evidence of the four legal non-engaged political strategies in each host market 
 
Host markets Legal non-engaged 
political strategies 
Quotes 
   
Venezuela  Low-visibility strategy *** ‘We were politically neutral and adopted a low profile since this host government is scanning to identify ‘against the regime’ firms to apply 
hostile measures against them or even expropriate their sites.’ [I001] 
 
Rapid-compliance strategy *** ‘We modified our product labels, kept inventories low, and our prices followed those leading the market to ensure we could not be accused 
of price speculation by complying with law 39.658 in defense of the people for their access to goods and services.’ [I007] 
 
Reconfiguration strategy *** ‘We modified the legal proprietary structure of the production operation in Venezuela to a different origin: Costa Rica.’ [I004] 
 
Anticipation strategy *** ‘We have anticipated our entrance to new host markets in response to difficult conditions in Venezuela.’ [I001] 
 
  
Ecuador Low-visibility strategy *** ‘We adopted a politically neutral stance, not in favor of any government or party.’ [I001] 
 
Rapid-compliance strategy *** ‘We hired our outsourced employees directly to comply with the law that prohibited outsourcing in Ecuador.’ [I045] 
 
Reconfiguration strategy ** ‘Our new production operation in Peru gave us the security of having a second origin of exports through which we could provide products 
to Ecuador.’ [I017] 
 
Anticipation strategy ** ‘We permanently monitored prices every week and then every day.’ [I056] 
 
  
Nicaragua Low-visibility strategy *** ‘We evaded lobbying the Nicaraguan government because we were aware that this would not produce positive outcomes for the firm due 
to political differences between the Nicaraguan and our country of origin governments.’  [I015] 
 
Rapid-compliance strategy ** ‘We incurred in no acts of corruption to operate in Nicaragua.’  [I015] 
 
Reconfiguration strategy *** ‘We bought production operations in a new origin—Costa Rica—. Through these acquisitions we found production operations from which 
to competitively supply the Nicaraguan market.’ [I001] 
  
Anticipation strategy *** ‘We anticipated market restrictions derived from political differences were not going to change soon, and therefore, we designed alternative 
ways to enter Nicaragua.’  [I015] 
   
  We assigned each quote with asterisks to rate the evidence of legal non-engaged political strategies that was found in each host market through the interviews of informants within Nutresa.  






Table 5 Taxonomy of legal non-engaged political strategies to stay in or enter host markets of high political risk
 
 
 Low-visibility strategy Rapid-compliance strategy Reconfiguration strategy Anticipation strategy 
Definition Minimal degree of general attention from 
political and social actors 
High speed actions to obey the rules  Re-arranging the MNE’s organizational 
structure and processes for competitiveness 
Prediction of public policy and analysis of interest 
groups to anticipate responses 
Aim Aim to minimize the public visibility and 
risk exposure of MNEs, by not engaging 
with host governments, thereby reducing 
the likelihood of being the target of 
discriminatory policies or expropriation 
Aim to ensure MNEs comply with host-
countries’ public policy rapidly and 
completely to avoid sanctions, closure, 
or even expropriation 
Aim to align and adapt the structure and 
processes of MNEs to operate competitively 
in challenging host-country institutional 
conditions   
Aim to gain MNEs a first mover advantage by 
anticipating host governments’ future public policy 
directions and ways to gain social support to 
enhance MNEs’ legitimacy to survive 
Target Host governments, employees, customers, 
and the media 
Host governments or institutions that 
verify and police corporate regulatory 
compliance 
The non-market environment  The non-market environment  
Tactics - Evading influencing host governments 
- Pursuing a neutral political stance 
- Sustaining clear internal communications 
that center on operations rather than on 
political stances 
- Deploying locals to represent the MNE 
when interacting with host governments, 
other political actors, and customers  
- Adopting a low public profile and 
avoiding the media 
 
- Not engaging in acts of corruption 
- Developing tools to assure the MNE’s 
operations rapidly comply with public 
policy and an adequate management of 
external inspections 
- Paying just prices to suppliers to 
comply with pricing policies 
- Ensuring the MNE’s products rapidly 
comply with changing public policy 
- Modifying the MNE’s organizational 
structure and processes to rapidly 
comply with public policy 
 
- Modifying the MNE’s organizational 
structure and processes, not to rapidly 
comply with public policy, but to efficiently 
sustain or start competitive operations 
- Developing new ways to supply a restricted 
host market 
- Substituting imports in a host operation for 
local production to appear as a local value-
adding MNE  
- Changing the country of origin in the legal 
structure of a foreign investment  
- Acquiring physical resources to overcome 
or manage challenging host-country 
institutional conditions 
 
- Carefully evaluating future investments 
- Further penetrating and diversifying host markets  
- Monitoring home and host-government relations 
- Monitoring the host country’s institutional context 
by using human capital with knowledge 
- Anticipating possibilities to comply with the host-
country’s potential up-coming public policies 
- Investing in initiatives to sustain and improve the 
future competitive position of the MNE 
- Reducing operational costs to overcome increasing 
operational expenses related to the host-country’s 
public policies 
- Revising prices to maintain competitiveness and 
assure the best possible profit  
- Identifying products that can be profitably supplied 
in accordance with the host-country’s changing 
public policies  
- Mapping and analyzing the potential impact of key 
interest groups on the MNE’s operations to design 
ways to manage these relations 
- Provisioning in financial statements the value of 
the investments that face potential expropriation 




Table 6 Nutresa’s perceived host-country political risk and the use of legal non-engaged political strategies 
 
Host markets Perceived host-country  
political risk ratings* 
Low-visibility strategy** Rapid-compliance strategy Reconfiguration strategy Anticipation strategy 
Venezuela 5 7 5 13 14  
Ecuador 4.4 4 2 3 10 
Nicaragua 4 1 1 2 1 
United States 1 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 1 0 0 0 0 
  * The ratings in this column follow a scale from 1 to 5, being 1 the lower score and 5 the higher score. Ratings between 1 and 2.5 indicate low host-country political risk  
   while ratings between 3.5 and 5 indicate high host-country political risk. 
  ** The numbers in this column and the following columns indicate the frequency of use of each legal non-engaged political strategy in each host market. 
  
 
 
 
 
